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Truly:
If two men take up arms against 
each other
He who mourns will win.
—Lao-Tse1
In this article I intend to analyse the role of
emotions in the mental processes of historical
thinking. At first sight ‘thinking’ seems to be
something essentially different from emotion.
It strictly runs against the widespread mental-
ity held by scholars that emotions are biased
and subjective, whereas cognition at least has
the possibility of more intersubjective validity 
(traditionally called objectivity). But this is a
wrong impression. Thinking, as a cognitive
procedure, is, of course, different from the
feelings that go along with this process, but,
nevertheless, both dimensions of the human
mind are intertwined to a degree that we are
not normally aware of.
Let me start with a single observation. In asking 
about emotions in historical thinking, we have 
to look at historiography, of course. It is the pri-
mary document, the ‘source’, that we have to 
consult. Here historians express their feelings, 
and it is rather easy to show how these feelings 
shape their presentation. Ranke, for instance, 
once expressed a very interesting emotion when 
he started a lecture on “Modern History since 
the Peace of Westphalia”, held in 1847. Here he 
wanted to present his “standpoint”, which he
believed lay “in the realm of general thinking, 
of the conflict of leading opinions, which move 
his discipline”. He spoke of “method” and of “the 
scientific perception of universal history”. And it 
is in this context that he said that the impres-
sion of the simple facts of the past created an 
impression of feeling “wretched”, of having a
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Emotional Forces in Historical Thinking
“feeling for the voidness of all things and a disgust for the many heinous crimes by which men have 
stained themselves”.2 Starting from this emotion Ranke developed his idea of a highly meaningful es-
sence in these disturbing events. “History does not simply open up the realm of fleeting appearances, 
but that of the abiding spirit.”3 It is evident that within his conceptual framework of interpretation his 
“feeling of voidness” has disappeared. 
Here we see an internal interrelationship between emotions and cognitive elements in historical think-
ing at the level of its fundamental pattern of significance. It is this interrelationship which allows us to 
understand Ranke’s idea of universal history as an attempt to dissolve or overcome a fundamental 
experience of suffering. Suffering melts away under the sun of the idea that the events of the past in 
their temporal sequence testify to “the living God and the living men” being closely interrelated. The 
cognitive work of the historian serves to suppress a primary disturbing awareness of suffering and
pain. Without the expression of his disturbing emotions we could not understand a very important ele-
ment in Ranke’s historical thinking, which I would like to call a fundamental forgetfulness of suffering. 
Ranke’s case is not unique. On the contrary: this transformation of an emotionally destructive expe-
rience of history into a cognitively constructive interpretation seems to be typical for the origins of 
modern historical thinking in the early philosophy of history (if not for Western historical thinking in
general).4 Kant, who was one of the first to conceptualise the philosophy of history as a new way of 
understanding the past at the watershed to modernity, clearly expressed this destructive feeling: “It
is hard to suppress a certain disgust when contemplating men’s action upon the world stage. For 
one finds, in spite of apparent wisdom in detail, that everything, taken as a whole, is interwoven with 
stupidity, childish vanity, often with childish viciousness and destructiveness. In the end, one does not 
know what kind of conception one should have of our species, which is so conceited about its superior 
qualities.”5 And it was exactly in this context that he developed the idea of progress as the leitmotiv in 
which the past leads into a better future. “A philosophical attempt to write a general world history ac-
cording to a plan of nature that aims at a perfect civic association of mankind must be considered pos-
sible and even helpful to this intention of nature.”6 The same way of feeling and thinking can be found 
in Herder’s philosophy of history. “We tread the dust of our forefathers and walk on the sunken rub-
ble of destroyed human constitutions and kingdoms . . . Thus man doubts and despairs, . . . the whole 
surface of the events of the world speak for this sad lamentation.”7 Nevertheless, Herder thinks that 
historical thinking is able to pierce the surface of historical experience and to reveal the sense-bear-
ing depths of universal history: “The immortal totality survives the pains of the vanishing parts and
learns good from evil . . . We see a principle effective in all, namely human reason, which strives to 
create the one out of the many, order out of disorder, a whole with regularity and permanent beauty 
out of manifold forces and intentions.”8 Finally, it is left to Hegel to characterise history as a “slaughter 
bench”, to which the only adequate reaction is “the deepest and most helpless mourning” and “deepest 
compassion for nameless misery”.9 Reflecting this impression in the realm of human reason meant 
for Hegel the transformation of feelings into thoughts, thus leaving behind the horrors of the past in 
favour of the pleasure of understanding history as the progress of human freedom. Human suffer-
ing only appears as a means to a higher purpose.
It is easy to present a lot of evidence as to what degree and in what form emotions constitute the 
mental process of historical sense-generation. It transforms the events of the past into a meaningful 
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history for the present and its future perspective. This is seductive and worthwhile for our understand-
ing of what historians do in order to follow the course of the history of historical thinking concerning
this miraculous transformation of emotions into cognition. Emotions challenged by the perception
of what happened were transformed, as mere facts, into the cognition of what really happened (as in
Ranke’s famous phrase that he simply wanted to show how things really happened).10 But I will not go 
deeper into this history. Instead, I would like to give a metahistorical argumentation which underlines
this constitutive role of emotions. And, at the end, I would like give an example of not neglecting the
inspiring quality of emotions and accepting their transforming into cognition. It is the case of mourn-
ing in history, which may demonstrate that emotions and cognition are two sides of the same coin. 
In order to do so, I would like to start with a more general epistemological or even metaphysi-
cal argumentation concerning the interrelationship between feeling and thinking, emotion and
cognition. As academics we tend to emphasise the importance of thinking and arguing by using
concepts and ideas which have a cognitive nature. We tend to understand the emotions (even our 
own) which go along with the cognitive procedures of historical thinking as something additional, 
but non-essential, a kind of a background music that has no real function in our work. 
In order to overcome this grossly misleading understanding of the role of emotions in human cog-
nition, I would like to present a contradicting example. It stands for the fact that emotions not only 
constitute cognition, but allow for more insight than cognition can ever bring about. I refer to the
famous part in Marcel Proust’s novel À la recherche du temps perdu (1913) where he describes an
extraordinary emotional experience on the part of the narrator, while dipping little madeleine cook-
ies into a cup of tea. “A shudder ran through me . . . An exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses,
something isolated, detached, with no suggestion of its origin. And at once the vicissitudes of life had 
become indifferent to me, its disasters innocuous, its brevity illusory – this new sensation having
had on me the effect which love has of filling me with the precious essence, or rather this essence
was not in me, it was me . . . I begin to ask myself what it could have been, this unremembered
state which brought with it no logical proof, but the indisputable evidence of its felicity, its reality, 
and in whose presence other states of consciousness melted and vanished.”11
Here emotion transgresses cognition by presenting an insight into the reality of the world includ-
ing the reality of the feeling subject, – an insight, that can never be reached by cognitive proce-
dures. It is an emotion which leads the feeling person beyond the realm of logic. But this does not 
mean that it presents something irrational. On the contrary: it presents enlightenment, an aware-
ness of the essence of the inseparable unity of the world and the human being. This fundamental 
overwhelming awareness (we can, if we like, even call it ‘absolute’) is realised with the power of 
an emotive force of the human mind which is recognised as the constitutive and leading aim of
thinking itself. In the light of this emotional experience, thinking and cognition appear only as a
search for a lost emotion which will never reach its destination.
I am grateful that such a rehabilitation of emotions from their traditional underestimation has oc-
curred, in order to understand the mental process of historical sense-generation.
In order to make clear that emotions indeed play a constitutive role in this process, I would like 
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to start with a general idea of what human sense-generation is about. Sense-generation means
that humans have to understand and interpret their world and themselves in order to be able to
live in it, and with themselves and the others with whom they have to live together. This mental
process of sense-generation consists of four different procedures and their interrelationship. In
a very abstract form one can say that it starts with perception, proceeds to interpretation, brings
the interpreted perception into the general pattern of cultural orientation and provides the action-
guiding will with its meaningful intentions, its aims and purposes. The orientation procedure can
be divided (artificially) into parts: the orientation of human beings to the world, and the orientation
of the human beings to the realm of their own subjectivity. All procedures share a common sense-
criterion which keeps them together and guarantees a coherent interrelationship. This abstract
scheme can easily be applied to the specific procedures of historical sense-generation. 
This process of making sense of the past starts (in this abstract, schematic idea) with the perception 
of the past. Evidently, emotions play an enormous role in perceiving the past as something demand-
ing interpretation, demanding interpretation as history. Emotions open up the realm of the past.12
They transport it, so to speak, to the human mind and in doing so they prepare it for interpretation 
by giving it a precognitive meaning, with which it challenges the cognitive power of the human mind. 
Interpretation translates this precognitive ‘disclosedness’ (Erschlossenheit) into cognitive features. 
Historical cognition, resulting from this interpretation, can only fulfil its orienting function in practi-
cal life if it is furnished with elements of representation. Historical representation, as it is done in
historiography, does not only speak to the cognitive realm of the human mind, but to the human
mind in general, including its emotive and volitive dimensions. In this procedure of orientation
emotions become manifest in the aesthetic and rhetoric form of historical knowledge.13
Figure 1. Diagram of the procedures of sense-generation
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This emotive form of historical representation can be easily made clear as regards the internal 
orientation to human subjectivity by history. The mental pattern of orientation by history in this 
invisible realm of human subjectivity can be called historical identity. Nobody can deny the power 
of emotions in the mental processes of identity formation by historical representation. But it is im-
portant to know that these emotions featuring identity are inseparably synthesised with elements 
of interpretation. It is the mental process of narrating a story which synthesises them. The story 
itself can be described as the master narrative of oneself, be it the (auto-)biography of a person 
or the master narrative of a community.
The last procedure in sense-generation is the motivation of the human will with aims and pur-
poses, which gives its driving force a direction (thus fulfilling the role of ideas in influencing hu-
man activity, which Max Weber described as “Weichenstellung” [setting the course]).14 Here the 
emotive force of historical orientation is evident. We all know that people can kill others while fol-
lowing the national or ethnic master narrative inscribed on their minds. Ethnic cleansing always
needs a historical framework which decides who should be killed, and this framework is the re-
sult of historical sense-generation. 
So far, I have concentrated my argumentation on presenting the role of emotions in the mental 
processes of historical sense-generation. The cognitive factor has been mentioned but not expli-
cated in its own constitutive importance. Just one remark: the cognitive elements are necessary 
as a complement to the emotive side of historical sense. Sense is both: something for the senses 
and therefore emotional, and something for the mind, and that makes it cognitive, in any case. In 
the academic or broader sense of the word, the ‘scientific’ character of historical studies is based 
on this cognitive element in historical sense-generation. Historical studies, as an academic disci-
pline, gives these cognitive elements a certain form: it shapes them by methodical procedures of 
research. Interpretation is a cognitive procedure and cannot be dissolved in the essentially aes-
thetic and rhetoric procedures of historical representation.
Nevertheless, cognition has its limits and emotion can transgress them. In order to make this
plausible, I would like to come back to the example by Marcel Proust. I think that there is an ele-
ment or even a dimension in historical sense-generation which comes close to the precognitive 
insight Marcel Proust described. Indeed, there is a considerable precognitive dimension to histori-
cal sense-generation that lies beyond any possibility of being translated into cognitive structures 
and that, at the same time, presents a necessary condition for the idea of the utmost fulfilment 
of historical sense-generation.
In order to make this clear, it is useful to distinguish between three levels of historical sense-gen-
eration. The first one is the functional level, the level of practical life: here historical sense-genera-
tion is a cultural fact in social life. History is embodied in habits, manners and social activities. Here 
the past is already present in a meaningful way, conditioning present-day life, influencing cultural
orientation, preshaping possibilities of historical identity, etc. (We are used to thinking that history is 
only a construction. But we overlook the fact that before we construct it by the mental procedures 
of sense-generation, the constructors are already constructed by the past, which is present in the 
conditions and influences under which his or her work of historical representation is done.)
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The second level is the level of construction or of theoretical reflection: here deliberate activities of
the human mind take place; historians pursue their work, monuments are erected, etc. The third
level mediates between the first and the second. It is the level of pragmatic reflection and practical 
interference. Here the result of the historian’s work, the ‘constructed history’, is applied to practi-
cal life. It is the level of education, the place of the politics of identity and of the political struggle
over different interpretations of common goals, etc.
(A) Functional level of 
practical life
History as the presence of the past is a concrete social fact in the circum-
stances of human life by virtue of its pre-given sense criteria and disposi-
tions in the mentality of the people. It conditions (‘constructs’) the work of
historians.
(B) Mediating level of 
pragmatic interference 
and reflection
History as a pre-given fact of cultural orientation in social life is picked up
as an element of evidence and experience and becomes a matter of inter-
pretation. History as a result of mental activities is brought into practical
life and addresses its embodied history. It works on, confirms, criticises or 
changes it.
(C) Level of theoretical 
reflection
History is a result of a mental activity, of making sense of the past in order 
to understand the present and to expect and project the future. It is a matter 
of ‘construction’.
Table 1: Levels of historical consciousness
Let us look at the interrelationship of these three levels and how history is done there. We see
that in practical life the pre-given history always challenges people to reflect it, interpret it, and
to give it meaning and significance. Historical sense is embodied in social reality, but only in such 
a way that it has to be picked up and worked through, completed and changed. Mediating the
results of this world of theory into practical life is a procedure which (subsequently) can be un-
derstood as a historical process in its own right. This historical process has an epistemological
peculiarity. It can never be conceptualised on the level of construction. It happens on the blind
spot of historical thinking. So, history takes place through and beyond the procedures of histori-
cal sense-generation. The process of sense-generation follows this history but can never reach 
it. Nevertheless, it is exactly this history which is the most ‘actual’, the most lively, and, I dare
say, the most historical. It is, at least, the most real one, since it is a procedure of the life-world
of historians themselves, and the life-world is the most real reality for us humans. The onto-
logical and epistemological character of history as a life-world may be described by the philo-
sophical term of Unvordenklichkeit (literally unprethinkability, which means precognitive and
unthinkable at the same time).
Is there a way to access this living, most historical history? Since it cannot be conceptualised by 
cognitive means, it cannot be constructed as it happens; the only access is the precognitive, and
that brings us back to emotion.
Sometimes historians describe enlightening moments that stimulate them as intuition in a most
elementary and effective way. I imagine that these intuitions stem from this un- and prethinkable
history which is pursued by the process of historical sense-generation. But these are very rare mo-
ments and many historians overlook or even do not experience them in following the main roads 
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of pre-established paradigms of historical research and historiography. Nevertheless, we cannot 
think about the work of historians without presupposing that they believe in the possibility of gen-
erating sense out of the perception of the past from its core, namely the reality of the past in the
midst of our life-world. This belief is unvordenklich (unprethinkable). As such, it is an emotional
condition without which the work of historians would be impossible. So, even the smallest trace of 
madeleine cookies are present in the work of historians; and they should dip them more frequently 
into the tea of their metahistory in order to gain more powerful intuition for their work. 
I would like to end my argumentation with an example of an emotion which should play a much 
more important role in historical thinking than we are accustomed. I think of mourning as a nec-
essary factor of historical sense generation, in that the challenge of traumatic historical events
presents an adequate answer.15 I tackle this issue not in order to distinguish between emotion
and cognition but to show how they can form a synthesis.
In order to make this plausible, I shall start with a short explication of what I mean by a traumatic
historical experience.16 Experiences of the past which negate and even destroy the possibility of 
giving them a historical meaning are traumatic. A past gets its historical meaning by relating it to
the cultural orientation of present-day life. The past becomes history if it is interpreted within a cat-
egorical framework of a time concept that relates it to the present, to its needs for understanding its 
temporal order and to the changes which have taken place. This interpretation bears the necessity 
of projecting a future perspective for human activity. History is an interrelationship between past,
present and future, brought about by an interpretation of the experience of the past. History, there-
fore, brings past, present and future into a meaningful coherence. This coherence is constituted by 
the principles of historical sense and meaning. Trauma is a certain quality of the experience of the
past. Past events are traumatic when they negate and even destroy these principles. Trauma in
history breaks the coherence of the fundamental historical interrelationship between past, present
and future. One can generalise Dan Diner’s description of the Holocaust being a fracture of civili-
sation17 into a general meaning of trauma as an element of historical experience: it constitutes a
“broken time” in the categorical approach of historical interpretation.18
Historical events with a traumatic character confront historians with a borderline experience. They 
cannot be held within the realm of objective data, but they penetrate the realm where they are in-
terpreted. Today, we think that interpretation is a construction of meaning that we have imposed 
on the facts.19 In respect to traumatic experiences, we can see that historians’ work of making 
sense of the past is more than just providing a meaning afterwards: the facts themselves can
destroy or deconstruct the meaning of their interpretation. In this case, historians do not make
sense of the past, but the past has become senselessness for historians.
Trauma in history means that the work of historians proves impossible as long as they do not find 
an interpretative answer to this borderline character of the past, conditioning the sense criteria of 
its interpretation in a negative and destructive way.
The first reaction to trauma is silence. But historians have to speak about the past, unless they 
want to give up their profession. If they do their duty as historians and they make sense of the
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past, and if this is done by including its traumatic elements, history then pursues a detraumatisa-
tion of these elements by virtue of interpreting them.
There are different ways of historical detraumatisation (although this is not my point here). I would
like to problematise it in a more fundamental way: Does historical interpretation not distort the
specific character of the past with which it is concerned? 
My answer is yes, it does as long as there is no attempt at interpreting and representing the dis-
turbing experiences of the past in its traumatic character. That does not mean stopping to think
about and to express the horrific senselessness by remaining silent or by moving the events from
the field of history into that of myth. Instead, we have to look for and to realise the mode of his-
torical thinking that corresponds to the sense-destructing meaning. 
Trauma destroys meaning. Its historical interpretation has to realise this very loss of meaning
vis-à-vis what has actually happened. This is the door through which mourning enters the work 
of the historians.20
At first glance history has nothing to do with mourning. Mourning is emotional and related to losses
which have recently happened. History is cognitive and related to a remote past. This impression
is misleading, however, since history and mourning have something essential in common: both
are procedures of memory and committed to its logic of sense generation.
Mourning is a mental procedure of commemorating somebody or something lost. The loss has 
the specific character of personal loss with the passing of a beloved person or something. The 
purpose of this mode of commemoration is to regain oneself by “working through” the loss (in
the words of Sigmund Freud). Regaining oneself means to come back to life through the death
of the beloved person or object. In a certain way even the lost subject or object comes back: it
comes back in the form of the presence of absence, which enlarges the mental horizon of the
mourner through elements of transcendence.
The archaic paradigm for this mental procedure, which, of course, is a procedure of social com-
munication, is the ritual which transforms the dead person into an ancestor. As ancestors, the
dead get a new form of life, which is invisible but very powerful.21 This mental, personal and social
practice can easily be applied to history (astonishingly, this has not yet been done).
While I do not think that history today is ancestor worship, it does have some logical similar-
ity with it: we should realise that historical thinking itself, by its very logic, follows the logic of
mourning, at least partly in a formal way; it renders the absent past, which is a part of one’s own 
identity, present again.22 In fact, only the very past that is important for the people of the present
has to become history. This importance of the past can be characterised as its relevance for the 
essence of the people of today, for their identity. Identity is an issue of historical consciousness.
If we realise this, the past in the mental procedures of historical consciousness is essentially re-
lated to the group of people who feel that they belong together and are different from others. In 
respect to the identity of a person or a group, the past has nothing to do with the outside world, 
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nor is it external, but it is an issue relevant to the internal life of the human subject. The past has
a relationship to human subjectivity which can be compared with the power of deceased persons
or objects in the mourning process.
When we think about history in this relationship with human subjectivity, it becomes obvious that
historical consciousness renders the absent past, which is a part of one’s own identity, present.
And exactly this is brought about by mourning. So, in a simple logical argumentation, one can say
that mourning is constitutive for historical thinking in general and in principle. If those who have
passed away are in a positive relationship to the self-esteem of the people of today (and that is a
normal and usual relationship of historical consciousness all over the world), the remembrance
of them keeps alive or enlivens them through their death. To bring it to the point: in historical con-
sciousness the dead are still alive. And what makes them alive? What else but mourning?
I think that metahistory has completely overlooked this constitutive role of mourning in the pro-
cedures of historical memory. History renders the absence of the past to which the people of the
present are related as an element of their own selves present again. That is exactly what hap-
pens in mourning: something, a subject or an object to which the living person is deeply related
as a factor of his or her own self, passes away. This passing away endangers the related person
or people of losing themselves. They feel they are being towed away by this passing away and
they have to struggle to come back to themselves. This struggle is the mourning process.
In history we have a similar relationship between past and present: what has passed away is
relevant for the self-esteem and the self-understanding of the people of today and they have to
regain themselves by making the absent, their passed-away world, present again. The difference
between history and mourning lies, of course, in the character of this regaining of oneself. In the
case of mourning, it is painful and bitter. The experienced loss opens a wound in the mind. His-
tory, on the contrary, seems to be a procedure of remembrance, which does not have this pain-
ful element, but it is pursued as a gain, as taking over a heritage, as bringing about self-esteem.
But if the past of which history speaks has this relevant relationship with identity, can we even
think of its passing away as something which does not hurt? Does it not leave an open gap to be
filled by mental activity? I think it is worthwhile considering whether the procedures of historical
consciousness are grounded in a mourning-like process. This process seems to be covered by
an attitude in which the passing away has lost its pangs and has got another quality: that of in-
dependent fact-like things which can be picked up and integrated into the properties of oneself.
So, mourning as an issue of metahistory means, first of all, the recognition of the fact that there
is a basic element of mourning in historical consciousness. It is normally overlooked, since the
aspect of inheriting the past and the idea that it belongs to us and that we continue and develop
further its work, are dominant. Given this positive relationship of the past and the present in his-
torical consciousness, forming one’s own personal and collective identity is only possible if the
loss has been overcome. Since this loss inevitably and happens permanently with the change of
generations, it creates the past in the continuous passing away of the human world. This past has
to become history. As history, the absent past becomes present again. Since the procedure of this
passing away and overcoming it hurts, it is structurally forgotten in the act of doing history. 
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The most frequent mode of this forgetting is the idea that history is a subject matter of interpre-
tation, a raw material, onto which we impose our meaning. This is evidently the case in the ap-
proach of professional historians of thinking history as a reified pre-givenness of the experience
of the past. Here, history is something to be disclosed in the source material by going into the ar-
chives and finding out what actually happened.
So we have to look behind this abstract and alienated relationship between the historian as a re-
searcher, on the one hand, and his or her source materials, on the other. We have to analyse the
precondition for a meaningful relationship between past and present – called ‘history’. There is a
precognitive interrelationship between the past and the present. The past is already present in the
topical life procedures, where ‘history’ as a cultural practice takes place. Here, where the past is
living in the circumstances and conditions of human activity and suffering, mourning as a mode
of historical thinking is rooted.
I would like to illustrate this by the issue of humankind as a constitutive factor of historical iden-
tity. A historical experience which negates the universal validity of the category of humankind by 
depriving individuals of their status as human beings touches the very heart of all identity con-
cepts based on the category of humankind. If this negation is executed physically, one’s own indi-
viduality is destroyed in its universalistic historical dimension. Then the persuasive power of the
criterion of humankind as a basic value is fundamentally weakened. Such a historical experience
leads to the loss of the human self subjectivity in its specifically human quality. It deprives civi-
lised modern societies of their historical foundations and cannot possibly be integrated into the
course of time in which past and future are seen as being held together by the unbroken validity 
of humaneness as a normative value. It destroys the continuity of a history in which civil subjec-
tivity has inscribed its own universal norms.
What does it mean to face traumatic historical experiences? First and foremost, it means to realise
that hitherto culturally dominant criteria of sense generation have lost their validity for historical
discourse.23 But a loss is not a giving up. (Giving up the criteria of sense generation in historical
discourse on the grounds of deconstructing ideology would mean the cultural suicide of modern
subjectivity – a subjectivity that relies on the category of equality as the basis of mutual esteem
in human relations.) Acknowledging a loss without recognising what has been lost leads back to
the topic of mourning by history in a compelling way. At this point we are talking about historical
mourning in the sense of humankind being confronted with the historical experience of drastic
inhumanity. In this case mourning could lead to the recovery of one’s self as a fundamental hu-
man. Mourning would have to consist of acknowledging the loss. This implies two aspects: first,
to admit that humankind as a normative concept is lost or absent in historical experience, and,
second, to accept that whatever has been lost remained as one’s own (or better, has remained
one’s own in a new and different way).
What does this mean for the humankind criterion of historical identity? Humankind in the sense 
of the widest extension of modern subjectivity has been deprived of its historical significance, 
which has so far been regarded as part and parcel of one’s own culture (or civilisation). It has 
died as a consequence of the historical experience of crimes against humankind, which are in
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effect crimes against the self (or better, its mental disposition). The self as defined in relation to
humankind has died in the historical experience. Postmodernity has drawn a melancholic con-
clusion from this: it is no longer interested in the orientation towards humankind of modern
subjectivity.24 Thus, it leaves the subject of modern societies disoriented and incapable of acting
exactly at the point where its real-life context – in terms of political, social, economic and eco-
logical issues – is characterised by its objective universality: in its demand for human rights and
equality, as a regulating category of social conditions in the globalising process of capitalism and
in the global danger for the natural resources of human life.
In contrast to this melancholy attitude, mourning would be a cultural achievement. The subject 
could recover its own human dimension by moving beyond the deadly experience of a civilisa-
tion rupture. This way of mourning would not simply incorporate this experience into culture, but 
would regard it as an effective stimulus to accentuate the validity of an orientation towards hu-
mankind in a passionate, yet disciplined and patient manner.
What do we mean by humankind re-appropriated by mourning? What do we mean by humankind 
that is present in its absence? Mankind is no longer a naturally justified fundamental value of hu-
man activity per se. In a historical discourse based on mourning, humankind has literally become 
utopian because it has lost its fixed and steadfast position in people’s everyday world (Lebenswelt). 
As a consequence of its dislocation, it no longer can be taken as a plan for a world to be created 
(for that would correspond to an invocation of death and the designed world would be a phantom 
or ghost). As utopia, it would have an effusive, literally metaphysical status, beyond the reality of 
a civilised world. It would have to be taken as the yardstick for its criticism, a disturbing factor of 
insufficiency in respect to the achievements of civilisation.
But what do we mean by presence in its absence? Is it more than a shadow, a phantom of what 
could be, but unfortunately (because humans are so disposed) is not? In its absence, the notion 
of humankind could be no more than a conditional ‘as if ’ of the human understanding the world 
and themselves. It could, however, take the effect of a mental driving force for human action, as 
a regulative concept for something that cannot be obtained, but can only be put into practice. It 
would not be transcendentally (as empirically based metaphysics) but transcendingly effective as 
a value-loaded medium of sense definitions. This may stimulate actions by serving as a guiding
principle in the process of defining an aim. One could speak of fiction in the sense of a real con-
ditional ‘as if’. As lost, humankind is being reappropriated in the form of a standard aiming in the 
direction of an improving civilisation; and the fact that this has not yet been achieved urges man
into action. The lost reliable and valid norms are retrieved as disturbance, criticism, utopia, and
the motivation to keep one’s own world moving in a direction indebted to these norms.
This example of mourning illustrates the fact that a deep emotion can be conceptualised into a 
historical category, which discloses new chances for future directed historical thinking with all its
cognitive forces.
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